Sunday, 23 October 2016

Bail dismissed for offence of 34 ppc common intention

Bail dismissed for offence of 34 ppc common intention (Mujjan Ali Panhwar )
---S. 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.497---Common intention---Principle of vicarious liability---Applicability---Bail---To constitute an offence under S.34, P.P.C., it was not required that a person, should necessarily perform any act with his own hands---If several persons had the common intention of doing a particular criminal act, and if in furtherance of their common intention, all of them were jointly together, and aided or abetted each other in the commission of an act then one, out of three, could not actually with his own hands, do the act, but if he would help by his presence or by other act in the commission of an act, he would be held to have himself done that act within the meaning of S.34, P.P.C.---Principle of vicarious liability could be looked into even at bail stage, if from the FIR, accused appeared to have acted in pre-concert or shared to community of intention with his co-accused, who caused fatal injury to deceased, then he could also be saddled by constructive or vicarious liability.
2015 P Cr. L J 1531[Sindh]
Before Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J
RAB NAWAZ and 2 others---Applicants
versus
The STATE---Respondent

جيڪڏهن سرڪاري گواه شاهدي لا۽ پيش نه ٿيي ته ڪورٽ کي اختيار آ ته انجي سيلري روڪي ڇڏي ۽ جي پرائويٽ شاهد نٿو اچي ته انجي ملڪيت قبضي وٺي ڪورٽ کپائي سگهي ٿي.


جيڪڏهن سرڪاري گواه شاهدي لا۽ پيش نه ٿيي ته ڪورٽ کي اختيار آ ته انجي سيلري روڪي ڇڏي ۽ جي پرائويٽ شاهد نٿو اچي ته انجي ملڪيت قبضي وٺي ڪورٽ کپائي سگهي ٿي.
Salary can be stopped by court of officials persecution witness he fails to appear before court for evidence after recoding the statement of Process Server. (Mujjan Ali Panhwar)
(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
---Ss. 324/148/149/109---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.561-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Attempt to commit qatl-e-­amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, abetment---Constitutional petition---Prosecution evidence closed for non-appearance of prosecution witnesses---Validity---Record had revealed that on a number of dates of hearing statements of prosecution witnesses could not be recorded due to non-attendance of accused before the court---Trial Magistrate had been issuing orders for summoning the prosecution witnesses through non-bailable warrants mechanically without ascertaining and verifying if the same were in fact issued and served on the witnesses---Trial Court did not appear to have adopted any coercive measures such as attaching the properties of the prosecution witnesses under Ss.87/88, Cr. P. C. ---Trial Courts were not helpless in procuring attendance of witnesses and dealing with the process serving agencies which neglected the discharge of their duties---Petitioner being an injured witness in the case was an affected person and he was fully competent to assail the impugned orders before the higher' forum---Constitutional petition was converted into petition under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. by the High Court in the interest of justice--Impugned orders closing the prosecution evidence in the case were set aside in circumstances with the direction to petitioner to produce all the private witnesses in the Trial Court within a specified period---Trial Court was directed to adopt all possible measures to procure attendance of prosecution witnesses to conclude the trial possibly within one month---Petition was allowed accordingly.
(b) Criminal trial---
----Closing of prosecution evidence due to non-appearance of prosecution witnesses in Trial Court and failure of process serving agency to produce them in court---Guidelines for Trial Courts for action before closing prosecution -evidence.
If the prosecution witnesses do not appear and process serving agency fails to produce them before closing prosecution evidence, trial court was to follow the following guidelines.--
(a) The Presiding Officer shall verify if the summons/notices or the warrants of the prosecution witnesses are in fact issued and dispatched by Ahmad of the court.
(b) If the government officials, cited as prosecution witnesses do not appear before the court, after accepting service through summons/notices, the Presiding Officer may adopt coercive measures such as attachment of salary and also proceed to attach property of the private prosecution witnesses under S.87/88, Cr.P.C. after recording the statement of Process Server.
(c) In case service upon the prosecution witnesses is not effected by the subordinate staff, then the summons/notices or warrants of arrest of prosecution witnesses may be entrusted to the officers of the rank of A.S.-I. or S.I. of the Police Station concerned.
(d) If the Process Server is negligent in effecting service upon prosecution witnesses Presiding Officer may proceed against him under the provisions of Police Order, 2002 and also refer the matter to the District Police Officer concerned for initiating departmental proceedings under Efficiency and Discipline Rules and
(e) The Presiding Officer may also refer the matter to the District and Sessions Judge, for taking upon the matter in the monthly meeting of the Criminal Justice Coordination Committee.
P L D 2011 Lahore 551
Before Abdul Waheed Khan, J
MUHAMMAD SHAFI---Petitioner
Versus
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, KHARIAN DISTRICT GUJRAT and 8 others---Respondents

ايڪس پارٽي (ex parte) معني يڪطرفو فيصلو ڪنهن سول ڪيس م اگر ڊفينڊنٽ (ڇڪايل ڌر) نوٽيس تي نه اچي ته ڪورٽ کي پاور آ اها (ex parte judgment ) يڪطرفو فيصلو پلينٽف (ڪيس ڪندڙ) جي حق م جاري ڪري سگهي ٿي.


ايڪس پارٽي (ex parte) معني يڪطرفو فيصلو ڪنهن سول ڪيس م اگر ڊفينڊنٽ (ڇڪايل ڌر) نوٽيس تي نه اچي ته ڪورٽ کي پاور آ اها (ex parte judgment ) يڪطرفو فيصلو پلينٽف (ڪيس ڪندڙ) جي حق م جاري ڪري سگهي ٿي.
----Ex parte decree---Duty of Court---Scope---While passing ex-parte decree, it is the duty of court to see whether plaintiff is entitled to relief asked for and if so to what extent. (Mujjan Ali Panhwar)
2008 C L C 120 [Karachi]
Before Khilji Arif Hussain, J
Messrs AL-PAK GHEE MILLS through Managing Partner----Plaintiff
Versus
Messrs ZEESHAN TRADERS through Proprietor--Respondent

link /Incharge/Vacation judge in absence of Presiding Officer, power.

link /Incharge/Vacation judge in absence of Presiding Officer, power s of (Mujjan Ali Panhwar)
---Scope---Such judge having jurisdiction could perform all judicial functions, record evidence of parties and pass any order on merits within four corners of law.
2012 MLD 783 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD SAEED SHAH Side Opponent : Mst. PHILPANA

Wednesday, 12 October 2016

PLD 2008 Karachi 492-S. 497---Bail, grant of---Powers of Magistrate---Magistrate cannot grant bail unless the matter falls under one of the following categories

PLD 2008 Karachi 492

Before Khalid Ali Z. Qazi, J
THE STATE---Petitioner
Versus
MUHAMMAD AYOOB---Respondent
Criminal Suo Motu Revision No.79 of 2002, decided on 23rd June, 2008.
(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Bail, grant of---Powers of Magistrate---Magistrate cannot grant bail unless the matter falls under one of the following categories viz., (i) if the person seeking bail has been placed under actual custody; or (ii) he appears in answer to a process issued by the Court; or (iii) he is brought before the Court by the police or by some other arresting authority---There is no legal concept of a "judicial custody" by way of a voluntary surrender before the Court---Unless and until the accused is under actual restraint or custody by the police or other law enforcing authorities/agencies, he cannot be construed to be in "custody".
Muhammad Sharif v. The State 1979 PCr.LJ Note 7 page 5: Muhammad Saeed v. The State 1980 PCr.LJ 17; Hidayat ullah Khan v. The Crown PLD 1949 Lah. 21; The Crown v. Khsuhi Muhammad PLD 1953 FC 170; Sadiq Ali .v. The State PLD 1966 SC 589; Muhammad Ayub v. Muhammad Yaqoob PLD 1966 SC 1003; Juma Khan v. The State PLD 1960 Pesh. 25; Hakim Ali Zardari v. The State PLD 1998 SC 1; Wajid Ali v. The State 1983 PCr.LJ 183; Raza Muhammad v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 1190 and Taj Muhammad v. The State PLD 1976 Pesh. 112 ref.
(b) Judicial custody--
----Connotation---There is no legal concept of a "judicial custody by way of a voluntary surrender before the Court---Unless and until the accused is under actual restraint or custody by the police or other law enforcing authorities/agencies,' he cannot be construed to be in "custody".
(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497(5)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.471/468/420---Cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted by Judicial Magistrate, refusal of---Accused had surrendered himself before the Judicial Magistrate who vide impugned order had admitted him to bail---Validity---Held, the order of the Judicial Magistrate admitting the accused to bail was not in consonance with law, since in essence the Magistrate had granted bail before arrest to him, when he had no such power---There was no concept of a "judicial custody" by way of 'a voluntary surrender before the Court---Unless and until the accused was under actual restraint or custody by the police or other law enforcing agencies, he could not be construed to be in "custody"---However, the case was not fit to cancel the bail granted to accused at such a belated stage for the very simple reason that on account of the Record and Proceedings having been consigned to High Court, the trial had been delayed by 6/7 years, for which the accused could not be attributed any blame---Even the Prosecutor-General had conceded that cancellation of bail at such a belated stage would cause undue hardship to the accused---Accused had been appearing on every date before High Court---Bail allowed to accused was not cancelled in circumstances.
Muhammad Sharif v. The State 1979 PCr.LJ Note 7 page 5; Muhammad Saeed v. The State 1980 PCr.LJ 17; Hidayat ullah Khan v. The Crown PLD 1949 Lah. 21; The Crown v. Khsuhi Muhammad PLD 1953 FC 170; Sadiq Ali v. The State PLD 1966 SC 589; Muhammad Ayub v. Muhammad Yaqoob PLD 1966 SC 1003; Juma Khan v. The State PLD 1960 Pesh. 25; Hakim Ali Zardari v. The State PLD 1998 SC 1; Wajid Ali v. The State 1983 PCr.LJ 183; Raza Muhammad v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 1190 and Taj Muhammad v. The State PLD 1976 Pesh. 112 ref.
(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
---Ss. 497/498---Pre-arrest bail---Magistrate is not empowered to grant bail before arrest---Caveat on the legal plane added by High Court ,to take measures and precautions in respect of such powers of Magistrate after elucidating the concept enshrined in the settled law.
Muhammad Sharif v. The State 1979 PCr.LJ Note 7 page 5; Muhammad Saeed v. The State 1980 PCr.LJ 17; Wajid Ali v. The State 1983 PCr.LJ 183; Raza Muhammad v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 1190 and Taj Muhammad v. The State PLD 1976 Pesh. 112 ref.
Shahaddat Awan, Prosecutor-General and Amicus Curaie for the State.
F. Karim Durrani for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 23rd June, 2008.

JUDGMENT
KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J.---The brief facts giving rise to the present matter are that an F.I.R. No.77 of 2001 dated 11-4-2001 was lodged by one Abdul Majeed, the complainant, against one Muhammad Ayub, the accused, alleging commission of offences covered under sections 471, 468 and 420 of the P.P.C. The accused Muhammad Ayub surrendered himself before the Judicial Magistrate-II, Karachi (West), who vide order dated 16-4-2001 and while relying upon a judgment of the Lahore High Court reported as Muhammad Sharif v. The State 1979 PCr.LJ Note 7, page 5 was pleased to admit the accused Muhammad Ayub to bail.
2. Aggrieved against the grant of bail before arrest by the learned JM-II, the complainant i.e. Abdul Majeed filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.45 of 2001 under section 497(5) of the Cr.P.C. seeking cancellation of bail, which was dismissed vide order dated 31-10-2001 by the learned IVth Additional Session Judge, Karachi (West). Being further aggrieved by the order of the learned Additional Session Judge the complainant preferred Criminal Revision Application No.7 of 2002 before this Court.
3. It seems that the complainant Abdul Majeed lost interest and did not pursue the Criminal Revision Application No.7 of 2002. Thus vide order dated 15-4-2002 this Court' was pleased to convert Criminal Revision Application No.7 of 2002 into a suo motu criminal revision, which was thereafter numbered by the office as Criminal Suo Motu Revision No.79 of 2002. In converting the revision into a suo motu action, rather than dismissing it for non-prosecution, the Court in its order dated 15-4-2002 had pondered that the Judicial Magistrate had no power to grant bail before arrest. Hence notice was issued to the accused as to why the bail before arrest granted by the Judicial Magistrate ought not to be cancelled and the said accused remanded to custody.
4. The prime question posed in the present proceedings is whether the Judicial Magistrate possesses the power to grant bail before arrest and if no such power vests in .him, what should be the consequence, especially after a lapse of 7 years when the impugned order was passed by learned Judicial Magistrate.
5. I have heard Mr. F. Karim Durrani, the learned counsel for the accused so also Mr. Shahadat Awan, who first appeared as an Amicus curaie and then assisted this Court as the Prosecutor General.
6. In order to dilate upon the issue as to whether the Magistrate possesses the power to accord bail before arrest, in my opinion the case of Muhammad Sharif v. The State PLJ 1978 Criminal Case (Lahore) 553 = 1979 PCr.LJ Note 7 at page 5, serves as a starting point. In this case the petitioner sought bail before arrest directly from the Lahore High Court which was dismissed with the observations that even the Magistrate had ample jurisdiction to admit a person to bail before arrest. In this respect Muhammad Afzal Zullah J., as he then was, observed as follows:--
"2. Learned counsel states that the petitioners cannot move for bail before arrest before a Magistrate. Insofar as the technical phraseology "bail before arrest" used in some rulings is concerned, this might, on face, appear to be correct; but the provisions contained in subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C. permits on accused person to appear before a Court of Magistrate even prior to his physical arrest and thus after presenting himself before the Court seek bail under sub-section (1) of section .497, Cr.P.C. For all practical purposes, if the Magistrate grants bail it would be bail before physical arrest."
In the afore-cited case, the learned counsel for the petitioner had clearly taken the stance that the Magistrate had possessed no power to accord bail before arrest, which position was refuted by the Court. The Court had observed that the Magistrate was empowered to grant bail before arrest even when the accused had surrendered himself before the Court of the Magistrate prior to his physical arrest; and the grant of bail by the Magistrate constituted bail before arrest.
7. It is, an irony of fate that the same point came up for reconsideration before the same learned Judge i.e. Muhammad Afsa Zullah, J., as he then was, in the case reported as Muhammad Saeed v. The State 1980 PCr.LJ 17. In this case while the learned Judge was pleased to observe, that his observations in the earlier judgment of Muhammad Sharif v. The State (cited supra) were not contrary to law, but relying upon Hidayatulalh Khan v. The Crown PLD 1949 Lahore 21. The Crown v. Khushi Muhammad PLD 1953 FC 170, Sadiq Ali v. The State PLD 1966 SC 589 and Muhammad Ayub v. Muhammad Yaqoob PLD 1966 SC 1003, the learned Judge was pleased to revisit the earlier judgment of Muhammad Sharif authored by him, holding that the Magistrate could only grant bail in the following circumstances:
"(a) if the person seeking bail has been placed under actual custody;
or
(b) he appears in answer to a process issued by the Court; or
(c) he is brought before the Court---.
(i) by the Police; or
(ii) by some other arresting authority."
8. The categories in which the Magistrate could grant bail, as under scored above, have been deciphered from the pronouncement of the 'Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadiq Ali v. The State PLD 1966 SC 589. A bare perusal of the above except would confirm that in the first category bail could only be granted if the person was in actual custody; the second category deals with a situation when a person appears in answer to a process issued by the Court. The grant of bail in this category is only relatable to ensuring appearance. In the third category either the police or some other law enforcing agency brings a person before the Magistrate. This really means that there is no scope for a person to contend that his voluntarily appearance before the Court should be construed as "judicial custody". The concept of "custody" as enunciated in The Crown v. Khushi Muhammad PLD 1953 FC 170 connotes that the person is under some actual restraint. In other words, there is no concept of constructive custody before the Court or a Judge by way of a voluntary surrender. To further make out this point reference is invited to Jumma Khan v. The State PLD 1960 Pesh. 25 wherein it was held that the appearance before the Court mentioned in section 497 of the Cr.P.C. is appearance in compliance with a process issued by a Court. It was further observed that where no process for_ the appearance of an accused person is issued by any Court and he voluntarily makes appearance, he is neither under any form of restraint nor has he any process for his restraint. Although the judgments in The Crown v. Khushi Muhammad and Jumma Khan v. The State were delivered at the time when the concept of bail before arrest was till in its embryonic state in Pakistan, the said two judgments are still good authority for the proposition and to the extent that a voluntary surrender per se before the Court of law cannot be construed as "custody". A word of caution is required to be placed. The latter two judgments in negating the concept of bail before arrest are no longer good law in the view of the development of the law of bail before arrest in our country. One may in this respect refer to the dissenting opinion of Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo, J., as he then was, in Hakim Ali Zardari v. The State PLD 1998 SC 1 wherein the learned Judge was pleased to observe that the law of bail is not static but rather grows so as to mouldy itself with the exigencies of time. Although the opinion of Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo, J., as he then was, in the referred case was a minority view, the observations just referred hold good as a general proposition of law. In other words, though the ultimate result as reached by the learned Judge may not be good law, being the minority view, the referred observations with regards the law of bail being a dynamic concept seems to be well settled.
9. Therefore, I hold as follows:--
(a) a Magistrate cannot grant bail unless the matter falls under one of the categories mentioned in the excerpt from Muhammad Saeed v. The State 1980 PCr.LJ 17 reproduced in para. 7 above.
(b) there is no legal concept of a "judicial custody" by way of a voluntary surrender before the Court. Unless and until the accused is under actual restraint or custody by the police or other law enforcement authorities/agencies he cannot be construed to be in "custody".
10. In light of the above, I have do hesitation to observe that the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate dated 16-4-2001 admitting the accused to bail was not in consonance with law since in essence the Magistrate had granted bail before arrest when he had no such power as held above. But having said so this is not a fit case to cancel the bail for the very simple reason that on account of the record and proceeding having been consigned to this Court the trial has been delayed by 6-7 years. For this, the accused cannot be attributed any blame. Even the learned Prosecutor General/Amicus Curaie Mr. Shahadat Awan has submitted that it is not a fit case to cancel the bail at such a belated stage since otherwise the said cancellation would cause undue hardship to the accused. The learned counsel for the accused has maintained that the accused has appeared on every date before this Court and has even executed a PR bond before this Court apart from submitting surety/security before the Magistrate. In view of the above the bail is not cancelled and the PR bond and. any other surety/security is kept intact.
11. Let the office remit the Record and Proceedings back to the learned trial Court immediately whereafter it is expected that the trial Court shall expeditiously complete the trial and pronounce judgment.
12. Before parting I wish to add a caveat on the legal plane. I have been able to lay my hands on Wajid Ali v. The State 1983 PCr.LJ 183 and Raza Muhammad v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 1190 where in certain observations give an impression that the Magistrate is empowered to grant bail before arrest. Such observations so also the judgment/order in Muhammad Shaif v. The State PLJ 1978 criminal Cases (Lahore) 553 = 1979 PCr.LJ Note 7 at page 5 are found to be per incurium, not being the correct statement of law. The observation in Muhammad Saeed v. The State 1980 PCr.LJ 17 to the effect the Muhammad Sharif's case (cited supra) is not contrary to law is again per incurium. Barring such observation, the judgment in Muhammad Saeed v. The State 1980 PCr.LJ 17 correctly states the law. In order to make the discussion complete, reference is invited to the case of Taj Muhammad v. The State PLD 1976 Peshawar 112. In this case petitioner had applied for a bail before arrest directly to the Peshawar High Court which was declined on the ground that before approaching the High Court the petitioner should first exhaust the remedy before the lower Court. It was further observed that it was only in exceptional cases that a petitioner could directly move for bail before the High Court. In dismissing the petition the Court was pleased to suggest that the legislature had conferred the power to grant bail to the Magistrate at the initial stage. The relevant excerpt in this regard from the above judgment of the Peshawar High Court is reproduced as follows:--
"To repeat it with emphasis, I must say that though the discretion under section 498 is absolute, the High Court and for that matter the Court of Session must exercise it judicially and since the Legislature has chosen to introduce 'the initial stage of dealing with the question of bail to Magistrates and while the Magistrates have ample power to exercise their discretion, in all matters barring very few, the High Court ought not to grant bail in such cases except for exceptional and for very special reasons. For these reasons, I do not consider this a. fit case for bail. The petition thus stands dismissed."
If the above judgment of the Peshawar High Court is construed as conferring upon the Magistrate the power to grant pre-arrest bail, it will face the same fate as' the case of Muhammad Sharif v. The State i.e. the Peshawar High Court judgment will also have to be reckoned as per incurium. However, in my humble opinion the above extract from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court is to be understood as only equipping the Magistrate with the power to grant bail after arrest in offences for which the Magistrate has the jurisdiction. The above observations, in my humble opinion, do not lay down the principle that the Magistrate has the power to grant pre-arrest bail. .
13. Let a copy of this order be made available to the learned Registrar of this Court, Secretary Law, Government of Sindh, Home Secretary, Government of Sindh and Secretary Prosecution Service Department, Government of Sindh, who in turn are directed to circulate this order to all the relevant functionaries. The Registrar of this Court is in particular directed to circulate a copy of this order to all the Judicial Magistrates in the Province of Sindh.
14. Before parting with the matter I wish to express my sense of gratitude for invaluable assistance rendered by Mr. Shandat Awan, who first appeared 'as Amicus Curaie and then assisted this Court as the Prosecutor General Sindh.
N.H.Q./S-55/K Petition dismissed.


2011 YLR 3034 [Lahore]ڪي خاندان پردي جي ڪري پنهنجي ڌيۡ يا ڀيڻ کي گهر ويهاريو ويٺا هوندا هن ۽ خلا چاهيندي به خلا نه وٺندا هن انهن لا۽ اهو آ ته فيملي ڪيس خلا جو يا خرچ زال يان ٻارن جو اٽارني جي ٿرو ٿي سگهي ٿو زال کي ڪورٽ م وڃڻ جي ضرورت ناهي. اٽارني پيء ماءۡ ڀاءۡ يا ڪوبه مائٽ ٿي سگهي ٿو.

ڪي خاندان پردي جي ڪري پنهنجي ڌيۡ يا ڀيڻ کي گهر ويهاريو ويٺا هوندا هن ۽ خلا چاهيندي به خلا نه وٺندا هن انهن لا۽ اهو آ ته فيملي ڪيس خلا جو يا خرچ زال يان ٻارن جو اٽارني جي ٿرو ٿي سگهي ٿو زال کي ڪورٽ م وڃڻ جي ضرورت ناهي. اٽارني پيء ماءۡ ڀاءۡ يا ڪوبه مائٽ ٿي سگهي ٿو.
Pre trial in family suit can be through attorney plaintiff in person not required (Mujjan Ali Panhwar )
(a)    West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched., Ss.10(3) & 18---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Suit for dissolution of marriage---Defendant's application for summoning of plaintiff in person---Defendant's plea was that plaintiff had not filed suit with her free consent; that she was not a pardahnashin lady and that her personal attendance in court was essential for reconciliation and to resolve question of authenticity of her signatures on plaint---Dismissal of such application by Family Court---Validity---Plaintiff living abroad had been pursuing suit through her attorney/father---Plaintiff had appeared before Family Court and made statement after putting her signatures on its order-sheet that she had to go to America and could not live with the defendant---Plaintiff was identified before Family Court by her counsel---Order of Additional Sessions Judge disposing of habeas corpus petition on plaintiffs statement was still holding field for not having been challenged any further by the defendant---Plaintiff was duly represented by her attorney, thus, there was no need of her personal appearance before Family Court---Plaintiff having appeared before Family Court, once or twice, would not be disentitled her to avail legal right provided under S. 18 of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 for all times to come---Personal appearance of plaintiff in conciliation proceedings was not mandatory---Question as to whether plaintiff was a pardahnashin lady or not, being factual one could not be decided in constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Defendant could raise such question before Family Court during trial or at time of final decision of case---Impugned interim order was neither illegal nor mala fide or without jurisdiction, thus, could not be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction---High Court dismissed constitutional petition in circumstances.
Muhammad Javed Iqbal v. Mst. Tahira Naheed and others 2002 CLC 1396 and Shahida Perveen and another v. Sher Afzal and 2 others 2006 MLD 1752 ref.
Khalid Mehmood Syed v. Razi Abbas Bokhari, Judge, Family Court, Lahore PLD 1979 Lah. 217; Mst. Saeeda v. Lal Badshah 1981 SCMR 395 and Saad Amanullah Khan v. Ayesha Tahir Shafique and another 1999 CLC 1544 rel.
(b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----S. 10(3) & 18---Pre-trial conciliation proceedings---Personal appearance of wife in such proceedings---Scope---Provision of S.10(3) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 for being directory neither required personal appearance of wife nor such appearance was mandatory---Court under S. 18 of the Act could dispense with legal requirement of personal appearance of Pardahnashin lady and allow her to be represented in such proceedings through her authorized agent---Wife having appeared before Family Court, once or twice, would not be disentitled to avail legal right provided under S. 18 of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 for all times to come---Principles.
Khalid Menunood Syed v. Razi Abbas Bokhari, Judge, Family Court, Lahore PLD 1979 Lah. 217 and Mst. Saeeda v. Lal Badshah 1981 SCMR 395 rel.
(c) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----Ss. 5 & 14---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199--- Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Interim order of Family Court---Such order, if neither illegal nor mala fide nor without jurisdiction, could not be challenged in such jurisdiction.
Saad Amanullah Khan v. Ayesha Tahir Shafique and another 1999 CLC 1544 rel.
2011 YLR 3034
[Lahore]
Before Malik Shahzad Ahmed Khan, J
AWAIS KHALID---Petitioner
Versus
JUDGE FAMILY COURT and others---Respondents


2014 MLD 440 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Date of brith was corected.

Date of brith was corected.
Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 120 ---Suit for declaration---Date of birth recorded in Service Record, correction of---Plaintiff (employee of Pakistan Steel Mills) alleged that his date of birth had wrongly been recorded in Service Record as 21-12-1951 instead of year 1956---Defendant-employer's plea was that suit was time-barred for having been filed after 30 years of joining service---Proof---Year of date of plaintiff birth was mentioned as 1956 in his old and new National Identity Cards, authenticity whereof had not been challenged by defendant---Joining report relied upon by defendant had been admitted by its witness not to be in handwriting of plaintiff---Defendant's witness admitted that plaintiff's date of birth recorded in Medical Card and Insurance paper was year 1956---According to plaintiff that he came to know about such wrong entry in his service record, when he applied for loan and he was informed that he was going to retire in year 2011 according to his date of birth i.e 1951, but defendant declined to correct same in year 2008---Defendant had failed to establish that plaintiff was in knowledge of such entry in Service Record prior to year 2008---Defendant had not produced any Rules/Regulations governing terms and conditions of its employees barring alteration in their date of birth---Suit was decreed in circumstances.

2014 MLD 440 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH 

PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. Versus MUHAMMAD ALIS.42--
Top of Form


Law in correction in judgment and decree

Law in correction in judgment and decree (Mujjan Ali Panhwar )

Ss.114, 152 & O. XX, R.3---Judgment, alteration of--- Competence of Court---Principle---Courts can alter or add in pronounced judgment while exercising jurisdiction under S. 152, C.P.C. or on review---Competence of Court to alter or add in already pronounced judgment is protected by law itself.

2016 YLR 1847 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD ARIF

Side Opponent : Mst. MUMTAZ HAROON
S. 152---Amendment of judgments, decrees and orders---Scope--- Section 152, C.P.C. dealt with correction of clerical and typographical mistakes occurring inadvertently in the judgment and decree or order apparent on the face of the record and without such exception no judgment and decree or order of a court could be reviewed, revisited, altered or modified.
2016 CLCN 57 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT

Side Appellant : Haji GHULAM HABIB

Side Opponent : TARIQ SIDDIQUE
S. 152---Clerical error, correction of---Court had power to correct clerical error.
2016 MLD 358 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD YASEEN

Side Opponent : NIZAMUDDIN
Ss. 151 & 152---Inherent jurisdiction of court---Correction of consent order---Permissibility--- Consent order is always open to correction if any error or omission is proved to have occurred to the satisfaction of the court.

2016 CLD 217 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

Side Appellant : BROADTEX (PVT.) LTD

Side Opponent : NIB BANK LTD.
Top of Form


NADRA was directed to issue card to adopted child (Mujjan Ali Panhwar)

NADRA was directed to issue card to adopted child (Mujjan Ali Panhwar)

S. 9---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Issuance of Computerized National Identity Card---Scope---adopted child ---Contention of respondent-NADRA was that petitioner was adopted child and she did not have a mother or father---Validity---Guardianship certificate had been issued in favour of petitioner by the court of competent jurisdiction---Petitioner had provided the name of her guardian and no contradiction existed in her documents---Every citizen in or out of Pakistan who had attained the age of eighteen years should get himself registered and a parent or guardian of every citizen who had not attained such age should not later than one month after birth of such citizen get such citizen registered in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance---National Identity Card was a document for identification of a citizen---Issuance of National Identity Card would mean that the information contained therein was valid and correct--- Application form issued by the NADRA had contemplated the category of guardian and same also inquired the relationship with the family head to be explained---Petitioner was entitled to registration with the NADRA and for issuance of her Computerized National Identity Card---Constitutional petition was accepted and respondents were directed to issue Computerized National Identity Card to the petitioner forthwith.

2016 PLD 393 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : KAINAT AKHTAR
Side Opponent : REGIONAL HEADQUARTER NADRA


Monday, 10 October 2016

موت جي ڪيس م فاسي نارمل سزا آهي جي ڏوه ثابت ٿيي ٿو ته.


موت جي ڪيس م فاسي نارمل سزا آهي جي ڏوه ثابت ٿيي ٿو ته.
Death penalty normally awarded in murder case.
(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 302, 324, 34 & 109---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention, abetment--- Reappraisal of evidence--- Death sentence, confirmation of---Cold-blooded murder---Promptly lodged FIR with specific role of firing assigned to accused---Day time occurrence---Medical evidence corroborated ocular account given by eye-witnesses--- Weapon recovered from accused matched crime empties recovered from the scene of occurrence---Presence of eye-witnesses at the scene of occurrence was natural as they resided near the place of occurrence---Site plan showed there was no obstacle between the eyes-witnesses and accused, thus, no possibility existed of accused not being properly identified---Appeal was dismissed accordingly and death sentence awarded to accused was confirmed.
Ata Muhammad and another v. The State 1995 SCMR 599 and Sarfraz alias Sappi and 2 others v. State PLD 2000 SC 1505 distinguished.
(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----S. 302---Qatl-i-amd---Reappraisal of evidence---Brother of deceased as eye-witness of the occurrence---Evidence of such eye-witness, reliance on---Scope---Evidence of eye-witness (brother of deceased) corroborated by recovery and medical evidence, and also matching evidence of other independent eye-witness---Eye-witness account given by deceased's brother could be safely relied upon in such circumstances.
(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----S. 302--- Qatl-i-amd--- Death sentence, award of--- Mitigating circumstances for reducing death sentence to life imprisonment---Lengthy incarceration of a convict as a condemned prisoner on its own was not a ground for seeking mitigation for reducing death sentence to life imprisonment.
2016 S C M R 958
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
Present: Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry, Gulzar Ahmed and Iqbal Hameedur Rahman, JJ
MUHAMMAD MANSHA---Appellant
Versus
The STATE---Respondent

family court has power to attach the move able/ immovable property of defaulter so also can ordered sell also

family court has power to attach the move able/ immovable property of defaulter so also can ordered sell also (Mujjan Ali Panhwar)
Ss. 5, Sched. & 13(3)---West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 90---Family Court---Decree for maintenance, execution of---Attachment and sale of judgment-debtor's immoveable property---Section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, empowered the Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue---West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, provided various modes of recovery of arrears of land revenue and one of the modes provided was selling the immovable property of the defaulter.
2015 SCMR 128 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : AMJAD IQBAL
Side Opponent : Mst. NIDA SOHAIL